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Abstract
Private wealth holdings are likely to become an increasingly important deter-
minant in the job exit decision of elderly workers. Net wealth may correlate with
worker’s characteristics that also determine the exit out of a job. It is therefore
important to include a rich set of observed characteristics in an empirical model
for retirement in order to measure the (marginal) effect of wealth on the job exit
rate. But even with a rich set of regressors the question remains whether there
are unobservable worker’s characteristics that affect both net wealth and the job
exit rate. We specify a simultaneous equations model for job exit transitions with
multiple destinations, net wealth, and the initial labour market state. The job exit
rates and the net wealth equation contain random effects. We allow for correla-
tion between the random effects of job exit and net wealth, and the initial labour
market state.
1 We are greatly indebted to Statistics Netherlands for providing the data.
2 email: hbloemen@feweb.vu.nl, phone: +31 20 5986037, fax: +31 20 5986005
3 Tinbergen Institute, Netspar, IZA.
11 Introduction
While population aging puts current pension systems under ﬁnancial strain, older cohorts
accumulate more private wealth than their predecessors until just a couple of decades
ago. Private wealth becomes an increasingly important ﬁnancial resource for the retired
compared to social security wealth. Pension arrangements become more ﬂexible owing
to institutional and ﬁnancial innovation. It therefore becomes increasingly important
to know if the private wealth holdings of households inﬂuence the ﬂow out of work of
elderly workers.
Economic models (such as exposed in Blundell et al. (1997), or Woolley (2004))
assign a positive impact of the level of private wealth holdings on the ﬂow out of work.
Bloemen (2006) empirically analyses the impact of the private wealth level of households
on the job exit rate of elderly male workers in the Netherlands. The analysis shows
that workers with higher levels of net wealth have higher retirement probabilities. The
analysis was carried out with a rich set of regressors and includes a sensitivity analysis
of the results, such as the use of diﬀerent measures of net wealth (including or excluding
housing equity and mortgage debt), checking for the impact of possible outliers in net
wealth, and varying the ﬂexibility of the age pattern. However, the analysis is based
on the assumption that, after controlling for all the observable regressors, there is no
correlation in unobservables between the level of net wealth and the job exit rate. The
question remains whether the estimated positive impact of wealth on retirement is a
causal eﬀect.
There are various reasons for a possible correlation in unobservables between the
level of net wealth and the event of job exit. Unobservables can aﬀect the relation
between net wealth and retirement in diﬀerent directions. First, planned behaviour of
households may play a role. Workers with a strong preference to retire early may have
accumulated savings throughout their working life in anticipation of the early retirement.
For such workers, we expect to see a positive relation between the level of net wealth and
retirement, but this is not a causal eﬀect of net wealth on retirement. In Bloemen (2006),
the implicit assumption is that this correlation can be ‘explained away’ by the observable
2characteristics of the worker, such as the level of education, the working sector, or the
household composition. To the extent that observables cannot capture this correlation,
the impact of net wealth on retirement that has been found is not completely causal.
Next, as pointed out by Bloemen (2002), the level of net wealth may be correlated with
(favourable) worker’s characteristics that also inﬂuence job attachment, layoﬀ rates,
and the attractiveness of pension schedules. Finally, there may be observable variables
that are not observed in our data that can aﬀect both the level of net wealth and the
exit out of a job. A good example is the health status of the worker. In his review,
Smith (1999) mentions a positive relationship between net wealth and health status. In
addition, health status can inﬂuence the exit out of work along diﬀerent exit routes,
including disability and retirement. If low health-low wealth workers are more likely to
exit a job by disability, the estimated impact of net wealth on job exit along this route
will be biased downward. In the present analysis, we make use of subjective survey
indicators of the general health status of workers, but these may approach the health
status of individuals in a rough way. Alternatively, there may be unobserved details of
the individual’s pension arrangement that correlate with the level of net wealth.
In this paper we present a joint model for job exit of elderly workers and their net
wealth holdings. The job exit probability and the net wealth equation both include
unobserved individual speciﬁc random eﬀects that we allow to be correlated. By allow-
ing for this correlation, we aim to capture the aforementioned channels by which the
level of net wealth and the job exit transition may be correlated. The model is com-
pleted by adding an initial condition for the labour market status of elderly workers.
By incorporating initial conditions, we allow for possible selectivity of the sample: for
studying job exit transitions, we use a sample of employed workers. The probability of
selecting employed workers depends on past exit rates, and more speciﬁc, on past levels
of net wealth. For instance, individuals with high net wealth levels may have already
exited from the labour force at earlier age. On the other hand, if wealth levels correlate
with unfavourable individual characteristics, individuals with low wealth levels are likely
selected in a sample of workers.
In section 2 we present the data that are used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the
3model. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of the model. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
2 The data
We use data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel collected by Statistics Netherlands
(SEP) for the years 1995 through 2002. Survey waves are available on a yearly basis, and
refer to the month May each year. For the construction of our data on job exit transitions
we use employed individuals who are observed in at least two consecutive survey waves,
such that we can observe changes in the labour market state from one year to another.
Our model includes initial conditions for the labour market state. Therefore, we add
observations on non-employed individuals, for which we apply the same selection criteria.
We selected male individuals appearing in any of the survey waves in 1995 through 2001
in the age range of 48 through 64 who report to be employed. We use the subsequent
wave to check the labour market state of the same individuals in the next year.4 The
ﬁrst wave of observation of the employed individual will be used in the estimation of the
initial condition. The same holds for non-employed individuals.
We add information on the individuals’ background characteristics from the ﬁrst wave
of each pair of waves, except for income. For instance, if we select an employed individual
in the age range 48-64 in the year 1995, we use the wave in 1996 to check whether a
job exit took place, and use information on net wealth, marital status, pension scheme
participation, etc, from the May 1995 wave. However, since information on income
refers to the previous ﬁscal year, we use income information from the May 1996 wave,
which refers to the calendar year (January-December) 1995. Since the survey in May
1996 collects information on the wage income earned in 1995 and also on the number of
months worked in that year, we can determine the monthly earnings of each individual
in the year 1995, which is assigned to the monthly wage income earned in May 1995. For
the estimation of the net wealth equation and the initial condition we will use ‘lagged’
4 An important condition is that information on the same individual is present in the next wave.
Individuals that are subject to attrition of any kind are dropped from the data. This requires the
assumption that unobserved factors in the attrition process are uncorrelated with unobservables in the
determination of the labour market state.
4income information. We use information on income from the May 1995 wave, which
refers to the year 1994. This example is for the years 1995-1996 but the same holds for
any other pairs 1996-1997 through 2001-2002. Self-employed individuals are excluded:
the survey does not apply the questions on wealth to the self-employed.5
The longitudinal dataset of the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) provides aggregate mea-
sures of assets and debts. The aggregate measures are computed by aggregating infor-
mation on several asset and debt categories. The value of total liquid assets is obtained
by Statistics Netherlands by aggregating the amounts on the current accounts and sav-
ings accounts, bonds, stocks, money lent, value of jewelry, antiques, and cars.6 Total
debts (excluding the value of mortgage debt outstanding) are obtained by aggregating
personal loans at banks and credit institutions, loans to ﬁnance purchases, and remain-
ing (including money borrowed from family and friends). Net liquid wealth is computed
by the diﬀerence between liquid assets and total debts. An alternative measure of net
wealth can be obtained by incorporating the value of the house and the mortgage debt.
By adding the value of the house and subtracting the value of the mortgage debt from
the value of net liquid wealth deﬁned above, we obtain this alternative measure of net
wealth.
The tables 1 and 2 show information on the sample that is used in the estimation of
the initial conditions. With the estimation of the initial conditions we explain the labour
market status of a worker the wave he has been selected into the sample. We include
regressors that are typically observed for both nonemployed and employed individuals.
We will not include net wealth and disposable household income among the regressors of
the initial condition, but we will allow for correlation between the wealth equation and
the initial condition (see next section). The lagged value of disposable household income
will be included as a regressor in the net wealth equation.
5 In the waves of 1995 through 2001, information on income in the previous fiscal year is expressed
in guilders. In the year 2002, the information on income has been collected in euro. We have converted
this information in euro to guilders by multiplying the amount by 2.20371 which is the euro to guilder
exchange rate.
6 Not every household has possesions in each category. Money in current and savings account is most
common. Jewelry and antiques applies to few households only. In this paper we only consider aggregate
wealth and not the relation between portfolio composition and retirement.
5We use indicators for the level of education ranging from primary education (level 1)
to university (level 5). In addition, we use indicators for the sector that respondents have
been educated for, including technical, economic/administrative, general, and services.
These sectors can be observed for both the employed and the nonemployed.
We ﬁnd that the nonemployed in the age range from 48 through 64 are on average
older, less wealthy, and have a lower total disposable household income. We also ﬁnd that
the spouse is employed less often, and if she is employed, her earnings are lower. There
are more lower educated and less higher educated individuals among the nonemployed.
The percentage of married men is lower among the nonemployed, whereas the percentages
of single, divorced, and widowed men all are higher.
To summarize the information on job exit transitions, we have pooled the (pairs
of) waves with information on job exits. This results in 3711 observations on 1113
diﬀerent workers. Note that we use more observations on workers in the estimation of
the initial conditions, since we use less regressors, and consequently the requirements
for observability are less stringent. We will discuss the variables that we observe in our
sample by looking at tables 3 and 4. The tables contain sample descriptives on continuous
and count variables (table 3) and dummy indicators (table 4). The descriptives of the
demographic characteristics are very similar to those for the workers in the tables 1 and
2.
There is limited information on participation in pension schemes in the survey. Each
respondent is asked to report whether he participates in an employee pension scheme.
Table 4 shows that this is the case for 89.8 per cent of the respondents, whereas 1.8 per
cent does not know the answer to this question. Usually, the pension premium is withheld
automatically from the salary by default. However, 4.1 per cent of the individuals claims
to pay a pension premium directly. For these individuals, information is collected on the
premium contribution paid: the average contribution is 253 guilders. In 73.8 per cent
of the cases the employer contributes to the payment of the premium, according to the
survey respondents.
Some individuals participate in an individual pension scheme, initiated by themselves.
The motives for participating in an individual pension scheme can be quite diverse and
6are not recorded in the survey. We can imagine that poor employee pension schemes or
many job changes in the past may add to the participation in individual pension schemes,
but an alternative motive may come from high income people who have more ﬁnancial
means to invest in individual pension schemes. In any case, someone participating in
an individual pension scheme has a certain awareness of his ﬁnancial situation after
retirement, and including information on participation in individual pension schemes in
the job exit rate may proxy this awareness as well as the ‘true’ impact of the pension
scheme itself. We see that 15.6 per cent of the respondents participates in an individual
pension scheme. The sample average of the monthly contribution is 407 guilders.
We have included some other properties of the job. We see that 32.0 per cent of the
respondents characterize themselves as a civil servant. Early retirement schemes of civil
servants are known to be more generous and wide spread than for workers in the private
sector. At this age, most workers (96.0 per cent) have a ‘permanent’ job.
The mean value of total net liquid wealth is 62782 guilders, whereas the median is
24878. The alternative measure for net wealth, that includes the value of the house
and the mortgage debt, has a mean 282224 and a median value of 199209. The avarage
monthly wage income is 4729 guilders and the other income is 240 guilders. The value of
the monthly wage is important not only because it measures current earnings, but in the
Netherlands, pension beneﬁt systems are typically of the deﬁned beneﬁt type and the
future pension beneﬁts are directly based on the ﬁnal earnings. Bloemen (2006) shows
explicitly that the impact of the worker’s earnings on the job exit can have opposing
eﬀects on the job exit decision, since on the one hand higher earnings increase the incen-
tive to stay on the job, but on the other hand future pension beneﬁts will also be higher
if earnings are higher, generating a life cycle income eﬀect. We do not include an explicit
measure for pension wealth in the regression model. We do not observe pension wealth
in the data, but any constructed present value measure of future pension beneﬁts would
be a function of the observed ﬁnal earnings. By including the earnings, we therefore can
identify the impact of private wealth from the impact of pension beneﬁts. In the Nether-
lands, the employee pension schedules are organized by collective bargaining agreements
at the sectoral level. Replacement rates and age of eligibility to early retirement ben-
7eﬁts vary by sector. The survey contains detailed information on the industrial sector
of workers. Given the number of transitions observed, we have aggregated information
on industrial sectors in 12 categories. In addition, we use indicators for the sector that
respondents have been educated for. In the empirical analysis we estimate our base
speciﬁcation with these broad sectors, and we do a sensitivity analysis with the more
detailed industry dummies.
The survey contains subjective measures of the health status of individuals. Survey
respondents are asked “how, in general, is your health condition?”. They select one
answer out of the following 5 possibilities: ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘reasonable’, ‘bad’, and
‘very bad’. A majority of 61.4 per cent answers to be in good health, while 17.3 per
cent report to be in very good health, and 19.7 per cent call their health reasonable. A
minority reports their health to be bad (1.5 per cent) or very bad (0.08 per cent). In the
model, we will merge these two categories of bad health and use it as the reference class.
For the 3711 pooled observations of 1113 diﬀerent individuals we have tracked the
labour market state the next year: 208 (5.6 per cent) of them are observed not to have a
job the next year. Respondents that left their job are asked to report the reason for their
job exit from a list of possibilities. The most important reasons for job exit listed are
being ﬁred, end of contract, shut down of ﬁrm, illness/disability, early retirement/living
of one’s investments,7 pensioned, remaining (not speciﬁed any further). We have merged
several of these categories. We made a category ‘unemployed’ for being ﬁred, termination
of contract, and shut down of a ﬁrm: 15.9 per cent of the job exiters indicate that
unemployment is the reason for job exit. We also merged several categories of retirement.
Note that the retirement categories are self-reported, and that we cannot distinguish
whether someone goes on early retirement according to the narrow deﬁnition of the
early retirement system, or whether someone decides to live on interest. Moreover, the
category ‘pensioned’ is also recorded by some job exiters younger than 60, so it can
indicate that the reported ‘being pensioned’ may also include early retirement in the
narrow sense. There is a category ‘remaining’ which does not further specify the reason
for job exit. The respondents could also report job exit for reasons like ‘marriage’, ‘taking
7 In Dutch: ‘rentenieren’.
8care of the children’, and ‘taking care of a family member’, but none of the respondents
in our subsample reported any of these categories as the reason for their job exit. The
category ‘remaining’ does not include these types of reasons for job exit, and it seems
likely that it refers to job quits. We decided to merge it with the category retirement.
The percentage of job exiters by (early) retirement deﬁned this way is 72.1. Finally,
there is a number of job quitters reporting to have exited the job because of illness or
disability. The percentage is 12.0.
Bloemen (2006) showed that job exit rates varied with age, with very low exit rates
until the age of 54 and a clear peak at the age of 60, which coincides with the most
common early retirement age. Moreover, before the age of 54 unemployment or disability
are more often reported as reason for job exit, while thereafter (early) retirement becomes
an increasingly important reason for job exit.
3 The model
3.1 The job exit rate: theoretical background
Blundell et al. (1997) and Bloemen (2006) show that net wealth enters the job exit
probability in a life cycle model that allows for consumption, wealth accumulation and
savings, the trade-oﬀ between retirement and work, and uncertainty in the availability
of jobs. The choice to exit the job or to stay is based on comparing the levels of the
value functions associated with the alternatives. Let Vt(At, yt; dt+1) denote the value of
choosing labour market state dt+1 at the end of period t, (dt = 1 indicating employment
and dt = 0 indicating retirement) for someone employed at the beginning of period t
(dt = 1). At denotes the level of net wealth at the beginning of period t and yt is the
income in the current job, that enters the function since it aﬀects the level of pension
beneﬁts in typical deﬁned beneﬁt plans (see the model formulation in Bloemen (2006)).
The worker decides to exit the job if Vt(At, yt; 0) > Vt(At, yt; 1). The labour market
state aﬀects the value function since it can aﬀect the accumulation of pension wealth,
the eligibility to retirement beneﬁts, the level of income, and it can have a direct eﬀect
9on utility. The probability8 that the worker decides to leave the job is
P (dt+1 = 0|dt = 1, At, yt) = P (Vt(At, yt; 0) > Vt(At, yt; 1)) (1)
Under some regularity conditions the probability of exiting the job in a period t, condi-
tional on the level of wealth at the beginning of the period, is increasing in the level of
wealth. We may want to extend the model with job exit due to demand side shocks. If
uncertainty in the availability of jobs is expressed by an exogenous lay-oﬀ rate δt then
the probability that the worker exits the job in year t, conditional on being employed at
time t, can be expressed as9
P (dt+1 = 0|dt = 1, At, yt) = δt + (1− δt)P (Vt(At, yt; 0) > Vt(At, yt; 1)) (2)
The expression for the job exit rate (2) shows that according to economic theory net
wealth enters the job exit rate by the choice to exit the job, and not by the layoﬀ
rate δt. For this reason we will in the empirical analysis make a distinction between
diﬀerent exit routes, and distinguish retirement from alternative reasons for job exit, like
unemployment and disability. Kapteyn and De Vos (1998) argued that alternative exit
routes for eldery workers, like unemployment and disability, are ﬁnancially attractive,
and job exit by these routes may occur in good harmony between the worker and the
employer. Therefore, choice may not be completely absent as a factor determining the
job exit by any of these routes, and net wealth may aﬀect the exit rate.
Economic theory formulates the eﬀect of private wealth on retirement as a marginal
eﬀect: when comparing two workers (or situations) that only diﬀer in their level of private
wealth, the worker with the highest level of net wealth will have the highest probability
to retire. To measure this impact of net wealth on job exits empirically in a regression
framework, we include controls for demographics (age, household composition, level of
education), ﬁnancial conditions (income, participation in pension schemes), factors that
inﬂuence the layoﬀ rate (sectors, industry), factors that determine the pension wealth
8 Here we have left the source of uncertainty unspecified, but income uncertainty is the usual source
of uncertainty specified in life cycle models.
9 Note that the probability to stay on the job is (1 − δt)P (Vt(At, yt; 0) ≤ Vt(At, yt; 1)) which adds
with (2) to 1.
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(the current earnings, industry), etc. But there may remain factors that cannot be
controlled for by observables. The level of net wealth can be endogenous if a worker
has accumulated wealth in the past with the aim to retire early. Workers with the same
observable characteristics may have diﬀerent preferences for the age of retirement. The
level of net wealth may correlate with favourable unobserved characteristics that aﬀect
the layoﬀ rate δt negatively. There can be characteristics that are both correlated with
the retirement decision and the level of net wealth, but are not observed in our data.
For these reasons it can be important to allow for correlation in unobservables between
the exit rate and the level of net wealth in the empirical model speciﬁcation.
To estimate a basic speciﬁcation of job exit rates, without unobserved individual
eﬀects, a sample of elderly workers can be selected in one period and their labour market
status in the next can be recorded to determine whether or not retirement took place.
However, if there are unobserved individual speciﬁc eﬀects that may be correlated over
time periods, selectivity of the sample becomes an issue. The probability of ﬁnding
someone in the state of employment can be a complex function of past outﬂow, inﬂow,
and staying-on rates. For instance, the probability of ﬁnding someone in employment at
the time of selection into the sample may depend on the level of wealth. In the empirical
speciﬁcation, we specify an initial condition for the labour market state that we allow
to be correlated with unobserved individual random eﬀects in the job exit rates and the
level of net wealth.
3.2 The empirical model
Our empirical model describes transitions out of work into diﬀerent destinations, along
with model equations for net wealth and the initial labour market state.
We use a multinomial logit model to analyse the impact of net wealth on the job exit
rate. To have a reasonable number of observations in each state of destination, we made
a combined exit route unemployment/disability. This combined exit route represents job
exit through other reasons than retirement. It represents job exits induced by restrictions
in either labour market conditions or health status. We are aware that job exit for these
reasons may contain a choice element, as discussed above, but for ease of terminology
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we will label this exit route ‘involuntary job exit’ in the sequel. For an individual i
selected in the sample in period t and whose labour market state we keep track of in
period t+1, we have three possible values for the outcome variable dit: staying employed
(E), retirement (R), and involuntary job exit (I). The state of employment is our base
category, such that the probabilities we specify below are job exit probabilities. If xit is
a vector of explanatory variables, we specify the probability of job exit to state J as
P (di,t+1 = J |dit = E, xit, αi) =
exp(xitβJ + γJαi)
1 + exp(xitβR + γRαi) + exp(xitβI + γIαi)
, J = R, I
(3)
with βJ , J = R, I the parameter vectors measuring the impact of the explanatory vari-
ables xit on the probability of job exit to state J . The level of net wealth at the beginning
of period t, Ait, is included among the regressors xit. In (3) αi represents the unobserved
individual speciﬁc variation in job exit rates. We include one individual speciﬁc random
eﬀect αi, irrespective of the state of destination, as we typically observe only one realized
exit route for the job exiters in our sample. The impact of the random eﬀect on job exit
is measured by γR and γI , depending on the state of destination.
Next, we formulate an equation for the level of net wealth. Since the empirical
distribution of net wealth is highly skewed, Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) propose
to use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to transform the level of net wealth.
The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation g(Ait, θ) on net wealh Ait is
g(Ait, θ) ≡
ln[θAit + (θ
2A2it + 1)
1/2]
θ
(4)
with θ a parameter.10 The transformation (4) has some convenient properties:
- If θ tends to zero, then g(Ait, θ) tends to Ait.
- Sign(g(Ait, θ)) = Sign(Ait)
- g(Ait, θ) is monotonically increasing in Ait
10 The parameter θ will be estimated. In applications, the parameter θ is often set to 1. Note,
however, that it is not a priori clear whether this is an appropriate choice. Expression (4) shows that
the appropriate level of θ is influenced by the scale of net wealth. Since we estimate all the model
parameters simultaneously by maximum likelihood, there is no need to set the value of θ a priori,
especially since (4) is a well behaved function of θ. In computing the likelihood, we have to be aware of
the Jacobian of the transformation (4), as shown in (11) in the appendix.
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- g(Ait, θ) is symmetric in θ, so we can restrict θ ≥ 0 without loss of generality.
The equation for net wealth now becomes
g(Ait, θ) = z
′
itδ + ωi + uit (5)
The net wealth equation contains an individual speciﬁc random eﬀect ωi and an idiosyn-
cratic error uit. We do not wish to interpret the equation for net wealth as a structural,
behavioural equation for wealth.11 The functionality of the net wealth equation is to
allow for correlation in unobservables between job exits and net wealth.12
The model is completed by adding an equation for the initial labour market state dit,
with dit = 1 if individual i, selected in the sample in period t, is employed and dit = 0 if
individual i is not employed.
d∗it = m
′
itη + ǫit
dit = ι(d
∗
it > 0)
(6)
with mit the explanatory variables, η the parameter vector that measures the impact
of the explanatory variables on the labour market state, ǫit the error term, and ι is
the indicator function.13 Note that an initial condition of the type we apply here is an
approximation for the ‘true’ probability that someone is working at the time of selection
into the sample. The latter probability depends on the entire labour market history of
individuals, and is a result of transitions in the past. Thus, it would also depend on all
past net wealth levels. We do not observe the entire life of individuals, and we follow
the usual approach in the literature here.14
11 A more structural equation, for instance, may call for the inclusion of (transformed) lagged net
wealth among the regressors. If this approach is followed, an initial condition (that does not include
lagged net wealth) for net wealth needs to be added. But since the coefficient of lagged net wealth
will be close to 1, it will wipe out the random effect ωi in (5). The consequence would be that any
correlation in unobservables between net wealth and the job exit probability would run through the
initial condition for net wealth. But then the approach becomes largely equivalent to estimating a net
wealth equation that does not include lagged wealth.
12 Below we comment on exclusion restrictions.
13 Note that we have added subscript t to (6) but the initial condition is applied to individual i the
year he is selected in the sample in the given labour market state.
14 Equilibrium search models (see e.g. Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998) sometimes ‘correct’ for
selection in the sample using structural model parameters by making use of steady state employment
rates implied by the model. In the context of a life cycle model in which net wealth has a typical life
cycle pattern, we cannot to rely on steady state assumptions. Alternatively, in duration models stock
sampling may be accounted for by conditioning on backward recurrence times (see e.g. Lancaster, 1979,
or Bloemen, 2005 for applications). This requires information about job tenure as well as information
on past levels of net wealth during the elapsed duration of the current job.
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We allow for correlation in the unobservables αi and ωi appearing in the job exit rate
and the net wealth equation respectively. Moreover, we allow for correlation between αi
and ωi and the unobserved error ǫit appearing in the initial condition (6). More speciﬁc,
we assume that αi, ωi, and ǫit follow a joint normal distribution, independently and
identically distributed across individuals: αiωi
ǫit
 ∼ N

 00
0
 ,
 1 σαω σαǫσαω σ2ω σωǫ
σαǫ σωǫ 1

 (7)
The formulated model allows for correlation in unobservables between net wealth, as
a regressor included in xit in (3), and the unobservables αi. The remaining regressors
are assumed to be uncorrelated with the unobservables in the exit rates. Moreover, we
assume that the regressors zit in the wealth equation and mit in the initial condition are
uncorrelated with αi, ωi, ǫit, uit and the errors governing (3).
To estimate the model we need to decide on exclusion restrictions. Good exclusion
restrictions are notoriously hard to ﬁnd in a life cycle model in which variables are jointly
determined.15 Expression (2) for the job exit probability suggests that the job exit rate,
for a job exit from period t to t+1, depends on net wealth at the beginning of the period
and on the earnings on the job. In the equation for net wealth (5) we include the net
disposable household income in period t − 1 among the regressors in zit to explain net
wealth in period t. This variable is not included among the regressors xit of the job exit
probailities (3). In the equation (6) for the initial labour market state at period t, we
include nonlabour income in period t − 1 among the regressors mit, which we do not
include in xit.
4 Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
The model equations (3), (5), and (6) with the covariance structure in (7) have been
estimated simultaneously by simulated maximum likelihood using 60 replications to sim-
15 For this reason, Bloemen (2006) emphasizes the importance of including a rich set of observable
regressors in the model.
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ulate the integration over unobserved random eﬀects. Appendix A shows the details of
the likelihood function.
We have done the analysis with two measures of net wealth. The ﬁrst measure we
refer to as ‘net liquid wealth’. It is deﬁned in the data section. The second measure adds
the value of the house and subtracts the amount of the mortgage debt outstanding. In
the tables with estimation results, the ﬁrst column(s) refer to the analysis with net liquid
wealth. The ﬁnal columns show the results with the alternative measure that includes
housing equity and the mortgage debt.
We start by discussing the results obtained with net liquid wealth. Table 6a shows
the parameter estimates of involuntary job exits. Theoretical considerations in section
3.1 suggest that involuntary job exits are mainly led by demand side factors and health
status, and are not the (direct) result of choice. The estimates in table 6a are in accor-
dance with that view. Net wealth has a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on involuntary
job exits. Having a permanent job reduces involuntary job exits. Also the subjective
health indicators add to the explanation of the involuntary job exit rate. Workers with
a very good health have a signiﬁcantly lower involuntary job exit rate than workers in
bad health (the reference group). The same holds for workers in good health and reason-
able health. We also see that the size of the coeﬃcients of the health indicator increases
monotonically if health status decreases. We see a negative eﬀect of marital status on in-
voluntary job exits. Further sensitivity analysis with information on the spouse’s labour
market state and the earnings of the spouse (not shown in the table) showed that this
eﬀect is caused by workers with an employed spouse: workers with an employed spouse
have a lower probability to exit involuntarily. Class endogamy and polarization may be
an explanation for this phenomenon.
Table 6b contains the estimates of the job exit rate into retirement. Net ﬁnancial
wealth has a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on the job exit rate into (early) retirement, even
though we allow for correlation in unobservables. Age plays an important role, showing
that the job exit rate increases with age. The level of education has an impact here. The
coeﬃcients are not all signiﬁcant, but show that workers with lower levels of education
have higher job exit rates into retirement. This may reﬂect preferences, but also job
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properties (jobs for higher educated may be more interesting). Workers with a perma-
nent job also have a higher exit rate into retirement, which reﬂects eligibility to (early)
retirement schemes of workers with a permanent contract. We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
eﬀects of the health indicators. This does not mean that health does not inﬂuence the
job exit rate by retirement at all. There is an indirect eﬀect: involuntary job exit rates
are higher for workers with lower health status, so once an involuntary exit has been
realized due to poor health, no exit into retirement can take place, since the diﬀerent
exit routes are competing risks. But in comparing job exiters into retirement with job
stayers, no impact of health is found. The information on pension premiums shows no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the exit rate on retirement.
The parameters γI and γR measure the impact of the random eﬀect αi on the job exit
rates (see the expression for the job exit rates in (3)). We see that the parameters γI and
γR have an opposite sign, and both are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This indicates
that there are unobservable factors that make workers that exit involuntarily diﬀerent
from workers that stay on the job during the sample period and from workers that
exit into retirement. Also job stayers and exiters into retirement seem to be diﬀerent,
conditional on the observable variables.
Table 7 contains the estimates of the net wealth equation (5). The level of ﬁnancial
wealth increases with age, and decreases wih the level of education. Net disposable
household income in the previous year has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of
wealth. Net ﬁnancial wealth diﬀers with the marital status of the worker. Divorced men
have the lowest level of net wealth, followed by married men. For single and widowed
men we do not ﬁnd much diﬀerence. We see a monotonically increasing pattern in the
year dummies. This may be the result of inﬂation or booming ﬁnancial markets in the
period.
Table 8 contains the results for the initial labour market state. Age and education
level seem to be the most important determinants here. We do not ﬁnd eﬀects of the
lagged nonlabour incomes, and also family composition and marital status do not matter.
Table 9 shows the parameter estimates of the covariance matrix in (7). For ease of in-
terpretation we have reparametrized the covariances into their corresponding correlation
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coeﬃcients. Random eﬀects play an important role in the explanation of the level of net
wealth, as shown by the parameter estimate σω. The correlation across time periods in
the net wealth level, due to the random eﬀect, is σ2ω/(σ
2
ω + σ
2
ν) and takes the value 0.61.
This shows that there is a lot of household speciﬁc correlation in the net wealth level
that cannot be explained by the observable characteristics that appear in the net wealth
equation.
Very important for the aim of our analysis is the parameter ραω that measures the
correlation between unobservables in the net wealth equation and unobservables in the
job exit rates. We have already seen that random eﬀects in the net wealth equation are
very important, and that unobservable random eﬀects cause involuntary job exiters and
job exiters into retirement to be diﬀerent from each other. The coeﬃcient estimate of ραω
is -0.27, which is negative but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. It is,
though, on the edge of signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Since the parameter γR is negative,
the unobservables in net wealth correlate positively with job exit into retirement. This
means that there are unobervables that cause both higher net wealth levels and higher
retirement rates. Such a positive correlation is, for instance, consistent with behaviour
of workers that accumulate high wealth because they prefer to retire early. In spite of
the positive correlation in unobservables, a positive and signiﬁcant impact of net wealth
on the retirement rate remains. The unobservables in net wealth correlate negatively
with involuntary job exits. A negative correlation is consistent with the phenomenon
that workers with a low level of net wealth may have unfavourable characteristics that
make them more likely to exit involuntarily.
The correlations with the initial conditions are small and insigniﬁcant. The descrip-
tives in tables 1 and 2 showed that workers and nonworkers are quite diﬀerent in terms
of observed charactertistics. For instance, their levels of net wealth are quite diﬀerent.
The correlation coeﬃcient ρωǫ which measures the correlation in unobservables between
the level of net wealth and the initial labour market state is -0.016 and is not signif-
icant, indicating that the observables included in the net wealth equation can explain
any correlation between labour market states and net wealth levels.
The results with the alternative measure of net wealth, that includes the value of
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the house and accounts for mortgage debt, are comparable to the results obtained with
net liquid wealth, but there are also important diﬀerences. First, the tables 6a and
6b show that net wealth has a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on involuntary job exits,
and a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on job exits into retirement. We see a positive and
signiﬁcant value for γI , the coeﬃcient of unobserved random eﬀects on the involuntary
job exit rate, and an opposite but insigniﬁcant estimate of γR, the coeﬃcient of random
eﬀects in the job exit rate into retirement. For the alternative measure of net wealth,
involuntary job exiters seem to be diﬀerent from stayers and job exiters into retirement,
whereas the latter two groups are more comparable in terms of unobservables, given the
observables that have been included. The net wealth equation (table 7) again shows a
negative impact of divorce on the net household wealth, which makes divorced men less
wealthy than single men or widowed. The estimates for initial conditions do not show
much diﬀerence with the earlier results. However, we do ﬁnd diﬀerences in the covariance
matrix. First, the standard deviation of random eﬀects σω and the standard deviation
σν of the time varying error are of diﬀerent order of magnitude, due to the fact that the
net wealth measure with housing equity itself is of a diﬀerent order of magnitude. The
correlation across time in unobservables, σ2ω/(σ
2
ω+σ
2
ν), now is 0.84, which shows an even
higher persistence in net wealth that is assigned to unobservables compared to net liquid
wealth. This reﬂects both the relatively large value of housing equity and mortgage debt
and the relatively illiquid nature of housing equity. The correlation coeﬃcient ρωǫ now
is signiﬁcantly positive, taking the value 0.084. This is not a large correlation, but is
shows that there is a selectivity eﬀect in net wealth if we select only working individuals.
By allowing for a nonzero value of ρωǫ, we have corrected for this selectivity eﬀect. We
also see a selectivity eﬀect between the initial labour market state and the random eﬀect
in the job exit rates: the parameter ραǫ takes the value -0.278 and diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from zero. This correlation is negative, indicating that unobservable factors that make
someone more likely to be employed also make someone less likely to exit involuntarily
(due to the positive value of γI). The correlation with exit into retirement is positive
(due to a negative ραǫ and a negative γR) but since γR is not signiﬁcant we have to
be careful in drawing ﬁrm conclusions. The direct correlation between random eﬀects
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in job exit rates and random eﬀects in net wealth, measured by ραω, is not signiﬁcant.
This implies that if there is any correlation in unobservables between net wealth and job
exit, it will run through the selectivity eﬀect of the initial conditions, and moreover, it
aﬀects the involuntary job exit rate rather than the job exit rate into retirement. The
computations of the elasticities in section 4.3 shed more light on this.
4.2 Likelihood ratio test
We have already seen that the estimated correlation coeﬃcients of the unobservables
do not show up signiﬁcantly at the 5% level in the speciﬁcation with net liquid wealth.
To further evaluate the impact of the inclusion of the random eﬀects in the model, we
compare the likelihood value of the full model we have estimated with two alternative,
simpler variants. The simplest variant is the model without any random eﬀects: in this
model variant we have set γU = γR = σω = 0 and as a consequence the correlations
in unobservables do not appear either. In the second variant we have included the
random eﬀects, but we have set the correlations in unobservables equal to zero: ραω =
ραǫ = ρωǫ = 0. All models include the same set of observables in the diﬀerent model
equations. Table 10 shows the likelihood values. The ﬁrst column shows the values
for the speciﬁcation with net liquid wealth. The large diﬀerences in likelihood values
between the simplest version without any random eﬀects and the speciﬁcations with
random eﬀects are indicative for the important role of random eﬀects in the wealth
equation and in the transition equation. It should be clear that if there is no correlation
in unobservables, both the speciﬁcation without random eﬀects and the speciﬁcation
with random eﬀects lead to consistent estimates. However, ignoring random eﬀects leads
to a loss in eﬃciency.16 From the numbers in the table we can conclude that the value
of the likelihood ratio test for testing the null hypothesis ραω = ραǫ = ρωǫ = 0 is 2.9.
The null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level, since the critical value of the χ2
distribution with three degrees of freedom is 7.8.
The second column contains the likelihood value for the speciﬁcation with liquid
and illiquid net wealth. For this speciﬁcation, table 9 showed evidence of selection on
16 Conditional on the hypothesis that the random effect specification is correct.
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unobservables through the initial labour market state. The value of the likelihood ratio
test for testing the null hypothesis ραω = ραǫ = ρωǫ = 0 is 10.5. The null hypothesis is
therefore rejected at the 5% level.
4.3 Elasticities
To gain insight in the sensitivity of the job exit rates with respect to the level of wealth,
we have evaluated the elasticities. The elasticities are based on the derivative of the
exit rate in (3) with respect to the level of wealth. We have evaluated the elasticities
in their sample means. We have computed the elasticities for the three diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations: (i) without random eﬀects; (ii) with random eﬀects, but correlations
between unobservables restricted to zero; and (iii) with random eﬀects and correlations
between unobservables unrestricted. The third variant corresponds with the estimates
in tables 6 through 9.
The values of the elasticities can be found in table 11. The upper panel shows the
results for the speciﬁcation with net liquid wealth. The elasticity of the job exit rate
into retirement with respect to net liquid wealth hardly diﬀers across speciﬁcations. If
we allow for correlation in unobservables between the level of net wealth and job exit
rates, we see that the numerical value of the elasticity is smallest, 0.13, which is in
accordance with the positive correlation in unobservables that we have found. However,
the diﬀerence is very small. Between brackets are the standard errors which show the
variation in the elasticities that comes from the variation in the parameter estimates.
The elasticity of the involuntary job exit rate shows more variation between the
diﬀerent variants, but in any case the elasticity is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The numerical value of the elasticity is largest if we allow for random eﬀects and for
correlation in unobservables between job exit rates and the level of net wealth. This
corresponds with the negative correlation in unobservables between the level of net wealth
and the involuntary job exit rate.
The lower panel shows the elasticities for the alternative measure of net wealth. The
estimation results showed that for this measure of net wealth, correlation in unobserv-
ables may matter, but mainly run through the initial conditions (selectivity eﬀect) and
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are likely to aﬀect the involuntary job exit rate most. This is conﬁrmed by the values of
the elasticities in table 11. The values of the elasticity of job exit into early retirement
hardly diﬀer with the inclusion or exclusion of random eﬀects, and with the inclusion or
exlusion of correlation between the unobservables. The elasticity of the job exit rate into
unemployment and disability with respect to wealth diﬀers most, ranging from 0.064
in the speciﬁcation without random eﬀects to 0.14 in the speciﬁcation with random ef-
fects and correlations in unobservables. However, the estimate of the elasticity remains
insigniﬁcant, although the t-value amounts to over 1.5.
5 Conclusions
Private wealth may become an increasingly important factor in the decision to retire.
The level of private wealth relative to social security wealth is much higher than it was a
few decades ago. Pension arrangements become more ﬂexible, assigning a larger role to
decisions by individual workers. Measuring the impact of net wealth on job exit therefore
is a relevant issue. The measurement of the impact of net wealth on job exit at older
age is complicated, as wealth and job exit may be correlated by many factors. As far
as these factors are observable, we can correct for them by the inclusion of regressors.
But there may be unobserved factors by which net wealth and the exit out of a job are
correlated that cannot be ‘explained away’ by observables. An analysis to measure the
impact of net wealth on job exit, that does not account for correlation in unobservables,
may leave us with an estimated impact of net wealth that is not completely a ‘causal’
eﬀect.
We may distinguish three main reasons for correlation in unobservables. The ﬁrst
is the (economic) behaviour of the individual: someone with a preference for an early
retirement may have exposed forward looking behaviour during working life and may
have saved speciﬁcally for retirement. Therefore, we may see workers with a high level of
net wealth to retire early. But this is not the causal eﬀect we are looking for. The impact
of net wealth on retirement would be biased upwards. A second source of correlation
by unobservables may be that net wealth can serve as a proxy for favourable individual
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characteristics that correlate positively with job attachment and negatively with layoﬀ
rates. This possible source of correlation by unobservables may be particularly important
for involuntary job exits. Neglectance may bias downward the impact of net wealth on
job exits. Finally, there may be missing information, like details of the worker’s pension
arrangement.
In studying job exit behaviour, it is natural to select a sample of employed workers,
as job exit applies to employed workers only. However, if there are unobservables cor-
related across time, selectivity in the state of employment becomes an issue. Especially
if workers and non-workers tend to have diﬀerent wealth levels. Non-workers may have
quit their job because of their (high) level of net wealth. Alternatively, if net wealth
correlates negatively with layoﬀ rates or health status, non-workers may be found to
have lower wealth levels. If this selectivity eﬀect in turn is correlated with unobservables
in the job exit rate, we have another reason why an analysis that neglects correlation by
unobservables leads to biased estimates of the impact of net wealth on job exit.
We use data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel from the years 1995-2002. We se-
lect employed individuals and track their labour market state the next year to determine
job exit. On job exit, we observe the state of destination. In our model we distinguish
two exit states: retirement, and exit into unemployment and disability (labelled invol-
untary exits). Involuntary exits are more likely induced by demand side restrictions and
health risks. In the analysis, we apply two alternative measures of net wealth: net liquid
wealth and net wealth including housing equity and mortgage debt.
Our model consists of three parts: (i) a multinomial logit model for job exit into the
two alternative states of destination; (ii) a net wealth equation; (iii) an initial condition
for the labour market state. The multinomial logit model and the net wealth equation
both include an individual speciﬁc, time invariant, random eﬀect, that are allowed to be
correlated with each other, as well as with the initial condition. This way we allow for
the possible correlation in unobservables and the selectivity eﬀects.
The analysis shows that unobserved random eﬀects play a role in job exit rates. We
see that involuntary job exiters are diﬀerent, in terms of unobservables, from job stayers.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd evidence that job exiters into retirement may diﬀer from
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job stayers in terms of unobservables, depending on the measure of net wealth that we
use. The random eﬀect in the net wealth equation shows that there is a large persistence
in the level of net wealth that cannot be explained by the regressors in the net wealth
equation.
The analysis with the alternative measures of wealth show a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect of net wealth on job exit into early retirement. Elasticities of the job exit rate with
respect to early retirement hardly vary with the inclusion or exclusion of correlation in
unobservables. The eﬀect of net wealth on involuntary job exits is never signiﬁcant, but
the value of its estimate is not insensitive for the inclusion of correlation in unobservables.
The analysis with net liquid wealth provides only weak evidence of any correlation
in unobservables between wealth and job exit. We do not ﬁnd a selectivity eﬀect of the
wealth level that is due to selecting employed workers. For the analysis with net wealth
including housing equity and mortgage debt we again ﬁnd no evidence for a correlation
between the random eﬀects in the net wealth equation and the job exit rates. However, a
selectivity eﬀect is detected. There is a positive correlation in unobservables between net
wealth and employment, and a negative correlation in unobservables between selection
into employment and involuntary job exits. As a consequence, the elasticity of the
involuntary job exit rate is aﬀected most by the correction for selectivity: it seems to be
biased downward without this correction. However, the value of the elasticity remains
insigniﬁcant.
Evaluating the three reasons for possible correlation between unobservables in net
wealth and job exit rates, we can say that we do not ﬁnd evidence that the positive
eﬀect of wealth on job exit into retirement is biased by correlation through preferences
for retirement. In fact, the elasticity of the job exit rate with respect to net wealth is
hardly aﬀected by allowing for such correlation. There may be some evidence for the
second reason: for net wealth including housing equity and mortgage debt we ﬁnd a
positive correlation in unobservables between the employment state and the level of net
wealth, indicating that a high job attachment may correlate positively with the level of
net wealth. At the same time unobservables that correlate positively with employment,
correlate negatively with involuntary job exits. This way, there is an indirect negative
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correlation of unobservables in wealth and unobservables in unvoluntary job exit rates.
This may bias downward the estimated impact of net wealth on job exit for this reason.
That is why we see that estimators that correct for selectivity yield a higher value of the
elasticity of the job exit rate into this state of destination.
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A Likelihood contributions
We ﬁrst determine the likelihood contributions, conditional on the random eﬀects (αi, ωi)
in (3) and (5). The density of the ǫit in the initial condition (6), conditional on (αi, ωi)
follows from (7) and is normal with mean µǫ(αi, ωi) and variance σ
2
ǫ|(α,ω) with
µǫ(αi, ωi) ≡
1
σ2ασ
2
ω − σ
2
αω
( σαǫ σωǫ )
(
σ2ω −σαω
−σαω σ
2
α
)(
αi
ωi
)
(8)
and
σ2ǫ|(α,ω) ≡ 1−
1
σ2ασ
2
ω − σ
2
αω
( σαǫ σωǫ )
(
σ2ω −σαω
−σαω σ
2
α
)(
σαǫ
σωǫ
)
(9)
Let Ti1 be the ﬁrst year in which individual i is observed and selected into the sample.
The probability that the observed labour market state is employment, conditional on
(αi, ωi), is
P (diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi, ωi) = Φ
(
miTi1 + µ(αi, ωi)
σǫ|(α,ω)
)
(10)
If the labour market state is nonemployment the assigned probability will be
P (diTi1 = 0|miTi1 , αi, ωi) = 1 − P (diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi, ωi). We follow the employed indi-
viduals to track whether or not a job exit occurs. The assigned transition probability
P (di,t+1 = J |dit = E, xit, αi) indicates that the individual is employed in year t and is
in labour market state J in the subsequent year with J ∈ {E,R, I}. The probability is
deﬁned in (3).
The density of wealth, conditional on the random eﬀects, can be derived from (5) and
(7). We can write
f(Ait|zit, ωi) =
1
σu
φ
(
g(θ,Ait)− z
′
itδ − ωi
σu
)[
∂g(θ, Ait)
∂Ait
]
(11)
with φ(.) the standard normal density function.
For an individual i who is initially employed, and observed from Ti1 through Ti2, and
does not make a transition during this period, the likelihood contribution li(αi, ωi)
17 is
li(αi, ωi) = P (diTi1 = 1|miTi1 , αi, ωi)
Ti2∏
t=Ti1
P (di,t+1 = E|dit = E, xit, αi)f(Ait|zit, ωi) (12)
17 In general, a likelihood function is a function of the model parameters, conditional on the data.
For reasons of conciseness, we suppress the arguments in the notation.
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For an individual i who is initially employed, and observed to stay employed from
Ti1 through Ti2 but makes a transition from year Ti2 to Ti2 + 1 into state of destination
J, J = I, R the likelihood contribution conditional on random eﬀects is
li(αi, ωi) = P (diTi1 = 1|miTi1, αi, ωi)
∏Ti2−1
t=Ti1
P (di,t+1 = E|dit = E, xit, αi)f(Ait|zit, ωi)
×P (di,Ti2+1 = J |diTi2 = E, xiTi2, αi)f(AiTi2 |ziTi2 , ωi)
(13)
For initially nonemployed individuals we only have the initial condition and the wealth
level. Note that the likelihood contribution of the nonemployed does not involve the
labour market transition probabilities (3) and therefore it can be simpliﬁed by integrating
over αi, or equivalently, by using the density of ǫiTi1 conditional on ωi only. For generality
of notation, we keep αi in our expression. So for nonemployed individuals, we have:
li(αi, ωi) = P (diTi1 = 0|miTi1 , αi, ωi)f(AiTi1 |ziTi1 , ωi) (14)
The likelihood contribution can be completed by integrating over the joint density of
(αi, ωi) which is normal and follows from (7). If we denote the density function by
f(αi, ωi) then the likelihood contribution li for individual i becomes
li =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
li(αi, ωi)f(αi, ωi)dαidωi (15)
In the estimation, we replace the integration in (15) by simulation. We draw R random
numbers (αir, ωir), r = 1, ..., R from its joint distribution, and we compute the simulated
likelihood contribution liR as
liR =
1
R
R∑
r=1
li(αir, ωir) (16)
In our application, we have set R = 60.
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Table 1: Observations used for initial conditions, sample descriptives
Nonemployed Employed
N = 572 N = 1187
Variable Mean standard Mean standard
deviation deviation
Age 57.4 5.3 51.3 3.8
# Children living in the household 0.45 0.82 1.1 1.1
Net total liquid wealth (guilders) 53110 126191 60504 146294
(Median): (15177) (21710)
Net total wealth (liquid + illiquid) 184256 267331 269514 498213
(Median): (85044) (170600)
Other income lagged (monthly) 371 2213 308 1520
(Median): (0) (0)
Earnings spouse (monthly, if employed) 1737 2762 1938 2815
(Median) (1299) (1641)
Other income spouse lagged 1240 12515 1107 10515
(Median) (0) (0)
Disposable household income lagged 42168 25605 66981 27902
(Median) (38243) (62076)
Table 2: Observations used for initial conditions, sample descriptives
Nonemployed Employed
N = 572 N = 1187
Percentage Percentage
Education Level:
1 (lowest) 21.2 6.8
2 22.7 15.2
3 37.8 46.4
4 13.5 21.2
5 4.7 9.8
Education type:
Technical 32.0 33.7
Economic/administrative 18.4 24.3
General 30.6 18.5
Services 19.1 23.5
No children in the household 70.3 39.8
Married 80.4 86.6
Divorced 9.8 6.7
Widowed 3.0 1.3
Single 6.8 5.5
Employed spouse (sample percentage) 25.3 51.1
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Table 3: Observations used for job exits, sample descriptives
Number of observations: N = 3711 (worker-years)
Variable Mean standard deviation
Age 52.6 3.5
# Children living in the household 0.88 1.0
Pension premium (monthly, guilders) 253 399
only for workers participating
in employee pension system
and paying premium directly
Pension premium (monthly, guilders) 407 640
only for workers participating in
an individual pension scheme
Net total liquid wealth (guilders) 62782 143244
(Median): (24878)
Net total wealth (liquid + illiquid) 282224 396281
(Median): (199209)
Net monthly wage income (guilders) 4729 3059
(Median): (4250)
Other income (monthly) 240 (1991)
(Median): (0)
Earnings spouse (monthly, if employed) 1918 (2317)
(Median) (1608)
Other income spouse 943 (7096)
(Median) (0)
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Table 4: Observations used for job exits, sample descriptives
Number of observations: N = 3711 (worker-years)
Percentage
Education Level:
1 (lowest) 6.0
2 14.3
3 47.6
4 21.9
5 9.5
Education type:
Technical 32.3
Economic/administrative 24.9
General 17.6
Services 25.2
No children in the household 46.9
‘Permanent’ job 96.0
Civil servant 32.0
Participating in employee pension scheme 89.8
Unknown whether part. in pens. scheme 1.8
Pays contribution directly 4.1
The employer contributes to premium 73.8
Participates in individial pension scheme 15.6
Married 88.1
Divorced 6.5
Widowed 1.2
Single 4.2
Employed spouse (sample percentage) 51.4
Still employed next year 94.4
Industry:
Agriculture, fishing 1.0
Food, textile 9.0
Chemistry, rubber 4.2
Production of Machines, instruments 7.0
Construction 8.3
Retail and trade 8.9
Transport 8.1
Finance, commercial services 11.9
Public government, education 26.1
Health care 5.8
Remaining services, public utility 4.2
Other, missing 5.5
General health condition:
Very good 17.3
Good 61.4
Reasonable 19.7
Bad 1.5
Very bad 0.08
Wave 1995 12.6
Wave 1996 13.5
Wave 1997 13.7
Wave 1998 14.5
Wave 1999 14.7
Wave 2000 15.9
Wave 2001 15.1
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Table 5: Job leavers: self-reported reasons to exit
Number of Job Leavers 208
Reason for exit Percentage of job leavers
Became unemployed 15.9
Illness Disability 12.0
(Early) retirement/living of one’s investments/quit 72.1
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Table 6a: The Involuntary Job Exit Rate
Net Liquid Wealth Net wealth (including
value house/mortgage)
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Intercept 1.001 1.106 0.469 1.163
Ln (Age/48) 14.710* 7.682 13.427* 7.831
Ln (Age/48) Squared -49.940 33.439 -41.349 34.049
Education level 1 (lowest) 0.292 0.914 0.425 0.997
Education level 2 -1.350 0.788 -0.986 0.812
Education level 3 -0.313 0.588 -0.192 0.620
Education level 4 -0.363 0.625 -0.302 0.656
Technical 0.369 0.443 0.407 0.462
Economic/administrative 0.278 0.469 0.329 0.493
General -0.261 0.636 -0.130 0.690
No Children in household -0.137 0.332 -0.113 0.352
Married -1.395** 0.595 -1.334** 0.606
Divorced -1.382 0.832 -1.216 0.842
Widow -0.822 1.112 -0.467 1.104
Civil Servant -0.573 0.409 -0.547 0.418
Part. in employee pension scheme -0.958 0.681 -0.694 0.710
Unknown whether part. in pens. scheme 0.757 0.695 0.816 0.718
Worker pays premium directly 1.852 0.901 1.822** 0.913
Pension premium (if paying directly) -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.004
Missing premium amount (if paying directly) -0.349 1.905 0.098 1.975
Employer attributes to premium 0.868 0.566 0.781 0.571
Permanent job -2.342** 0.456 -2.393** 0.487
Part. in individual pension scheme 0.445 0.490 0.407 0.526
Amount premium individual pension scheme -0.00036 0 0.001 0.00028 0.00074
Very good health -3.331** 0.694 -3.291** 0.723
Good health -2.717** 0.531 -2.649** 0.560
Reasonable health -2.394** 0.577 -2.352** 0.606
1995 0.480 0.500 0.533 0.512
1996 0.201 0.511 0.225 0.533
1997 -0.145 0.524 -0.147 0.542
1998 -0.516 0.543 -0.486 0.555
1999 -0.556 0.534 -0.468 0.535
2000 -0.661 0.553 -0.678 0.562
Monthly earnings 0.021 0.037 0.014 0.041
Other income/1000 -0.019 0.085 -0.023 0.074
Total net liquid wealth/10000 0.0074 0.010 0.0051 0.0033
γU (parameter random effect) 1.068** 0.347 1.264** 0.348
**: significant at 5% level
*: significant at 10% level
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Table 6b: The Job Exit Rate with Destination (Early) Retirement
Net Liquid Wealth Net wealth (including
value house/mortgage)
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Intercept -12.700** 1.772 -12.663** 1.773
Ln (Age/48) 33.902** 10.164 37.767** 10.368
Ln (Age/48) Squared -8.485 30.046 -23.706 30.122
Education level 1 (lowest) 1.451 0.693 1.432** 0.670
Education level 2 1.767** 0.603 1.799** 0.579
Education level 3 1.681** 0.568 1.753** 0.549
Education level 4 0.916 0.567 0.942* 0.545
Technical -0.028 0.287 -0.011 0.192
Economic/administrative 0.135 0.312 0.174 0.283
General 0.277 0.378 0.300 0.351
No Children in household 0.439 0.243 0.447 0.235
Married 1.007 1.066 0.828 1.050
Divorced 0.652 1.119 0.631 1.095
Widow 1.404 1.209 1.287 1.178
Civil Servant 0.343 0.240 0.293 0.231
Part. in employee pension scheme -0.135 0.423 -0.080 0.461
Unknown whether part. in pens. scheme 0.881 0.640 0.990 0.626
Worker pays premium directly 0.543 0.543 0.468 0.554
Pension premium (if paying directly) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
Missing premium amount (if paying directly) 2.420 1.196 2.384** 1.188
Employer attributes to premium -0.220 0.277 -0.241 0.279
Permanent job 1.667** 0.646 1.476** 0.616
Part. in individual pension scheme 0.059 0.453 -0.009 0.457
Amount premium individual pension scheme -0.001- 0.001 -0.0006 0.0007
Very good health 0.002 0.653 -0.166 0.904
Good health -0.053 0.641 -0.172 0.854
Reasonable health -0.122 0.662 -0.254 0.865
1995 0.932** 0.402 1.031** 0.398
1996 0.418 0.410 0.510 0.403
1997 1.020** 0.368 1.090** 0.364
1998 0.617 0.379 0.689* 0.375
1999 0.217 0.398 0.283 0.395
2000 0.333 0.370 0.353 0.370
Monthly earnings 0.023 0.027 0.029 0.026
Other income/1000 -1.789** 0.532 -1.407** 0.442
Total net liquid wealth/10000 0.020** 0.0078 0.0068** 0.0028
γR (parameter random effect) -0.445** 0.210 -0.215 0.214
**: significant at 5% level
*: significant at 10% level
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Table 7: The Wealth equation
Dependent variable: inverse hyperbolic sine of wealth/10000
Net Liquid Wealth Net wealth (including
value house/mortgage)
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
θ (parameter of transformation) 0.733** 0.029 0.135** 0.006
Intercept 2.054** 0.316 12.444** 1.057
Ln (Age/48) 2.136** 1.113 11.270** 3.557
Ln (Age/48) Squared 3.831 4.194 -9.953 12.939
Education level 1 (lowest) -1.103** 0.206 -4.140** 0.756
Education level 2 -0.679** 0.165 -3.744** 0.651
Education level 3 -0.646** 0.147 -3.545** 0.583
Education level 4 -0.122 0.154 -0.697 0.607
Technical 0.196** 0.093 1.060** 0.320
Economic/administrative 0.258** 0.096 1.316** 0.327
General 0.209 0.130 0.465 0.392
No Children in household 0.050 0.098 0.525** 0.293
Number of children in household 0.065 0.054 0.484** 0.165
Married -0.544** 0.236 -0.784 0.706
Divorced -1.050** 0.267 -3.218** 0.809
Single -0.115 0.294 -1.040 0.858
Net disposable household income lagged 0.0093** 0.001 0.036 0.003
1995 -0.548** 0.079 -4.502** 0.294
1996 -0.491** 0.081 -3.685** 0.278
1997 -0.391** 0.078 -3.192** 0.254
1998 -0.285** 0.074 -2.278** 0.223
1999 -0.157** 0.071 -1.562** 0.200
2000 -0.042 0.068 -0.488** 0.178
**: significant at 5% level
*: significant at 10% level
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Table 8: Initial condition: the employment equation
Net Liquid Wealth Net wealth (including
value house/mortgage)
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
Intercept 1.466** 0.350 1.507** 0.363
Ln (Age/48) 3.250** 1.471 3.242** 1.468
Ln (Age/48) Squared -44.576** 5.738 -44.568** 5.722
Education level 1 (lowest) -1.161** 0.209 -1.113** 0.210
Education level 2 -0.676** 0.168 -0.679** 0.168
Education level 3 -0.263 0.156 -0.265* 0.155
Education level 4 -0.061 0.170 -0.069 0.170
Technical 0.083 0.105 0.079 0.105
Economic/administrative 0.078 0.116 0.061 0.117
General 0.176 0.140 0.150 0.140
No Children in household 0.013 0.138 0.009 0.128
Number of children 0.090 0.069 0.090 0.066
Married 0.167 0.254 0.131 0.260
Divorced -0.084 0.282 -0.105 0.286
Single -0.156 0.293 -0.182 0.295
Non-labour income lagged 0.002 0.002 0.0014 0.0022
Non-labour income spouse lagged -0.003 0.003 -0.0033 0.0033
1995 -0.471** 0.151 -0.470** 0.152
1996 -0.272 0.189 -0.265 0.189
1997 -0.253 0.206 -0.247 0.205
1998 -0.184 0.193 -0.173 0.194
1999 -0.269 0.188 -0.280 0.188
2000 -0.083 0.184 -0.060 0.186
**: significant at 5% level
*: significant at 10% level
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Table 9: The covariance matrix
Net Liquid Wealth Net wealth (including
value house/mortgage)
Variable Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Estimate Error Estimate Error
σω (std. dev. random effect wealth) 1.393** 0.051 6.409** 0.245
ραω (corr. random effects job exit/wealth) -0.270* 0.164 -0.153 0.151
ραǫ (correlation job exit and initial state) -0.042 0.144 -0.278** 0.103
ρωǫ (correlation wealth and initial state) -0.016 0.048 0.084** 0.040
σν (std. dev. error wealth) 1.105** 0.031 2.783** 0.096
**: significant at 5% level
*: significant at 10% level
Table 10: Likelihood values
Likelihood values
Model speciﬁcation Net liquid wealth Net wealth (including
value house/mortgage)
No random eﬀects -14438.84 -20167.16
Random eﬀects, no correlations: -13679.44 -18484.54
ραω = ραǫ = ρωǫ = 0
Complete model: -13678.01 -18479.27
random eﬀects, unrestricted correlations
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Table 11 Elasticities of exit and staying on probabilities
with respect of wealth
evaluated in sample means
Elasticity No random Random eﬀects Random eﬀects
with respect to: eﬀects no correlations unrestricted
in unobservables correlations
Net liquid wealth
Exit to retirement 0.14** 0.15** 0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Involuntary Exit 0.034 0.0026 0.045
(0.046) (0.048) (0.049)
Net wealth (liquid and illiquid)
Exit to retirement 0.21** 0.20** 0.19**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Involuntary Exit 0.064 0.089 0.14
(0.091) (0.12) (0.09)
**: signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level
*: signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level
